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Abstract This paper presents the results of a qualitative
interview study exploring English and French physicians’
moral perspectives and attitudes towards end-of-life deci-
sions when patients lack capacity to make decisions for
themselves. The paper aims to examine the importance
physicians from different contexts accord to patient pref-
erences and to explore the (potential) role of advance
directives (ADs) in each context. The interviews focus on
(1) problems that emerge when deciding to withdraw/-hold
life-sustaining treatment from both conscious and uncon-
scious patients; (2) decision-making procedures and the
participation of proxies/relatives; (3) previous experience
with ADs and views on their usefulness; and (4) perspec-
tives on ways in which the decision-making processes in
question might be improved. The analysis reveals differ-
ences in the way patient preferences are taken into con-
sideration and shows how these differences influence the
reasons physicians in each country invoke to justify their
reluctance to adhering to ADs. Identifying cultural differ-
ences that complicate efforts to develop the practical
implementation of ADs can help to inform national policies
governing ADs and to better adapt them to practice.
Keywords Decision-making for incompetent patients 
Advance directives  Patient preferences at the end-of-life 
England, France  Qualitative study  Comparative
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Introduction
Respect for patient autonomy is an essential element of
modern medical ethics (Beauchamp and Childress 2008).
But there are instances in which a patient is not able to
communicate her will, such as when people are kept alive
in chronic and at times critical condition. These kinds of
cases raise difficult questions about how to respect people
who cannot communicate. For several years, advance
directives (ADs) have been discussed, first in the United
States and then in Europe, as one possible mechanism for
enabling a person to communicate, prior to any loss of
competence, her will regarding specific treatment refusals.
Several European countries, including England and
France have accorded legal status to ADs and the Council
of Europe (2009, 2012) has recommended that all member
states should adopt such legislation. Yet, the implementa-
tion of ADs remains problematic and raises numerous
ethical, legal and social questions. One difficult question is:
to what extent and under what conditions should an
anticipated treatment refusal be respected? I argue that
answering this question depends on an understanding of the
role patient preferences play in different countries. This
understanding gives rise to differences in the problems
associated with ADs and their potential role in different
cultural contexts.
This paper aims to examine England and France, two
countries that value patient autonomy differently. Whereas
the situation in England is influenced by a culture that
emphasises respect for individual wishes, the French situ-
ation reflects a culture promoting the protection of the
vulnerable person, even if this is to the detriment of the
person’s autonomy. Surprisingly, the implementation of
ADs is not significantly stronger in a context that values
respect for patient wishes than in a context where patient
R. Horn (&)
The Ethox Centre, Nuffield Department of Population Health,
University of Oxford, Old Road Campus, Rosemary Rue
Building, Oxford OX3 7LF, UK
e-mail: ruth.horn@ethox.ox.ac.uk
123
Med Health Care and Philos (2014) 17:425–435
DOI 10.1007/s11019-014-9558-9
autonomy is not the overriding principle. This paper will
show how the different value accorded to patient prefer-
ences influences the reasons physicians in each country
invoke to justify their reluctance to adhering to ADs.
Identifying cultural differences that complicate efforts to
develop the practical implementation of ADs can help to
inform national policies governing ADs and to better adapt
them to practice.
Background
In England,1 patient autonomy has a central place in health
care law, and it underpins the respect that must be granted
to a competent patient’s refusal of treatment (Airedale NHS
Trust v. Bland [1993]; Re B (adult: refusal of treatment)
[2002]; Foster 2009) whether the reasons for this are
rational, irrational or even absent (Re T (adult: refusal of
treatment) [1993]). Even where a patient has lost compe-
tence, a patient’s wish as expressed in an AD has long been
considered binding in common law. Since the Mental
Capacity Act 2005 fully came into force in 2007, ADs to
refuse treatment are a part of the statutory law. As already
formulated in the common law (Re T (adult: refusal of
treatment) [1992]; Re AK (medical treatment: consent)
[2000]; HE v A Hospital NHS Trust [2003]; W Healthcare
NHS Trust v H and others [2004]), an AD must be issued
voluntarily by a competent and sufficiently informed
patient, and apply to the circumstances that have arisen. In
a case where an AD concerns the withdrawal of life-sus-
taining treatment, the Act additionally requires that the
directive must be written, signed and witnessed, and clearly
states that the decision is to apply it even if life is at risk.
Under the Act, the patient can also appoint a ‘‘lasting
power of attorney’’. This clause allows patients to empower
someone to make health care decisions on their behalf
when they have lost the capacity to decide for themselves.2
Since Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993], English law
emphasises that, where an incapacitated patient has made
no clear statement when she was still competent, life-sus-
taining treatment should be withdrawn when it is no longer
in the patient’s best interests. When determining the
patient’s best interests, the Mental Capacity Act states in
part 1.4 that the physician must ‘‘so far as reasonably
practicable, permit and encourage the person [even with
impaired capacity] to participate, or to improve his ability
to participate, as fully as possible’’ in the decision. The
physician must also consider ‘‘the person’s past and present
wishes and feelings’’, her ‘‘beliefs and values that would be
likely to influence his decision if he had capacity’’.
In France, the option for patients to write an AD was
introduced in 2005 by the law on patients’ rights and on the
end of life (Loi no 2005-370). There is no evidence that
anticipated treatment refusals were previously recognised
in French jurisprudence. As now stipulated in Article L.
1111-11 of the Public Health Code, the doctor can take
ADs into account but is not obliged to do so. The patient’s
will, as expressed in such a directive, is indicative rather
than determinative (Feuillet Le-Mintier 2011). The law
states that the doctor alone makes the decision to withdraw
life-sustaining treatment. Yet, they are advised to consult a
colleague, the patient’s representative, the family, close
persons and, if one exists, the AD. Despite its non-binding
character, an AD must have been issued less than three
years ago. In the absence of a AD, there is no specific
requirement to find out what the patient’s wishes would
have been. A comparison of European states has found that
France confers the weakest power to proxies or surrogates
in decision-making (Lautrette et al. 2008).
The same law that introduced ADs extended a compe-
tent patient’s previous right to refuse ‘‘a’’ treatment (Loi no
2002-303) to the right to refuse ‘‘any’’ treatment including
clinically assisted nutrition and hydration (article L. 1111-4
Public Health Code). As also in the previous law of 2002,
the same paragraph stipulates that the doctor has to respect
the patient’s wish; yet where the treatment refusal endan-
gers the patient’s life, the doctor should ‘‘do all that is
possible in order to convince the patient’’ to continue the
treatment. Furthermore, it has been added in the new law of
2005 that ‘‘in any case, the patient has to repeat his/her
decision after a reasonable lapse of time’’, and ‘‘the deci-
sion must be recorded in the patient dossier’’. A patient’s
decision to refuse a life-sustaining treatment is considered
as so unreasonable that the patient has to repeat their will
twice and the doctor must take measures to prevent accu-
sations of negligence. Thouvenin (2011) points out that in a
clause that establishes a patient’s subjective right, in other
words, that defines the patient as the right-holder, such
limitation appears to be a paradox.
In spite of the different legal value accorded to ADs in
England and France, the number of written directives is
insignificant in both countries (Pennec et al. 2012; Seale
2006a, b; Schiff et al. 2000). Even in countries, such as the
United States, where the Patient-Self-Determination Act
has since 1990 accorded legal force to ADs, report prob-
lems in the uptake of these documents (Hanson and
Rodgman 1996). These findings have prompted authors
such as Fagerlin and Schneider (2004) to argue that ADs
have failed. They interpret the small numbers of ADs to
demonstrate that only a few people know what they want,
1 Although the English legal system essentially comprises England
and Wales, this paper focuses on England since this is where the
interviews were conducted.
2 This paper focuses only on ADs and will not analyse the situation




or/and can articulate their wishes, and that many fear
misinterpretations of their ADs or do not believe that they
would be taken into consideration.
Fagerlin’s and Schneider’s observations concerning the
difficulties to articulate future treatment wishes, the fear of
possible misinterpretations of ADs, and miscommunica-
tions between physicians and patients raise two overarch-
ing questions regarding the role of physicians in discussing
ADs: (1) How do physicians discuss future treatment
options with patients and may they better help them
express their wishes? (2) How do physicians take into
account patient preferences in decision-making, and what
are the arguments and underlying social values for doing
(or not doing) so in different legal contexts?
Numerous papers reflect on ADs from a legal or ethical
perspective (Buchanan 1988; Michalowski 2005; Feuillet
Le-Mintier 2011) and some empirical studies examine the
views of patients (Seymour et al. 2004; Rurup et al. 2006).
Others, based on questionnaires, focus on physicians’
attitudes towards ADs (Sahm et al. 2005; Rodriguez-Arias
et al. 2007; Bond and Lowton 2011). Yet, if we want to
better understand why English and French physicians may
promote (or not) the writing of such directives, it appears
appropriate to take into account, not only their attitudes
towards ADs, but also their general attitudes towards
patient preferences and how these attitudes reflect legal and
practical constraints which echo different cultural tradi-
tions (Cartwright et al. 2007; Menaca et al. 2012; Evans
et al. 2013). This paper explores problems physicians from
different contexts evoke with regard to end-of-life deci-
sion-making and shows how the place accorded to patient
preferences influences the potential role of ADs in ethics
guidance and policies governing ADs in England and
France. A better understanding of national differences and
of perceived problems rising in a specific context is much
needed to inform the development of ADs in European
policy-making.
Methods
This paper presents the results of 28 semi-structured face-
to-face interviews on physicians’ views on ADs, and more
generally on their experience in making end-of-life deci-
sions for incompetent patients. In 2011, 14 English and 14
French physicians were recruited from university hospitals
(n = 2 in England, n = 3 in France) in two different cities
in each country. The focus was on doctors working in
services which take care of seriously or terminally ill
patients (specifically, oncology, nephrology, neurology,
geriatrics and palliative care).
Ethical approval for the study was sought in England
from an NHS Research Ethics Committee; in France, the
Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Liberte´s
confirmed that no specific approval procedure was needed
for this study. However, access was negotiated with the
head of the hospital services and appropriate standards for
interviews set out, including guarantees of the anonymity
of participants. In England, according to the requirements
of the local research ethics committee, physicians were
approached after initial contact by the medical director of
each hospital, who invited them to contact the researcher if
they wished to participate in the study. Each participant
received an information sheet about the study and written
consent was taken prior to the interviews.
Interviews were conducted by an experienced sociolo-
gist in a quiet room in hospitals. Each interview lasted
approximately 45 min, was audio recorded and transcribed.
The aim of the interviews was to better understand the
importance of a stated treatment preference, and thus to
better grasp the potential role of ADs. For this purpose, the
interviews examined the following broad themes: (1)
problems that emerge when deciding to withdraw/-hold
life-sustaining treatment from both conscious and uncon-
scious patients; (2) decision-making procedures and the
participation of proxies/relatives; (3) previous experience
with ADs and views on their usefulness; (4) perspectives
on improving the decision-making processes in question.
The analysis of data gathered for each predefined theme
involved numerous readings of the transcribed interviews.
This was followed by identifying and refining comparable
recurrent themes and patterns that came out during the
interviews and that describe English and French physi-
cians’ attitudes and experiences.
Participants are identified according to their nationality
(En/Fn), gender (m/f) and their medical specialty (oncology:
onc; palliative care: pall; geriatrics: ger; nephrology: neph;
neurology: neur; intensive care: intens; rheumatology:
rheum; surgery: surg). Without aiming to make generalised
claims about ‘‘all’’ English or ‘‘all’’ French physicians, the
data echo tendencies which are also apparent in each coun-
try’s legislation, public debates, and professional guidelines
(Horn 2012).
Findings
The following findings are based on interviews illustrating the
experiences of 14 English and 14 French physicians. Out of
the 14 English physicians, 3 were oncologists, 3 neurologists,
3 palliative care specialists, 3 nephrologists, and 2 were ger-
iatrics. In France, out of 14 physicians, 3 were oncologists, 3
neurologists, 3 palliative care specialists, 2 nephrologists, 2
were geriatrics, and 1 doctor worked in intensive care. 7 out of
the 14 English physicians and 5 out of the 14 French physi-
cians were women. The small sample size does not allow us to
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show differences between physicians of different specialties
or according to their gender. Cartwright et al. (2007) suggest
that such characteristics are rather insignificant compared to
national differences, however.
Respect for patient preferences when deciding
to withdraw/-hold life-sustaining treatment
English physicians’ concerns to know their patients’
wishes
English physicians who were asked about difficulties they
encounter when deciding to discontinue treatment for both
competent and incompetent patients reported problems
regarding patient consent, the timing, and the prognosis. All
14 English doctors interviewed in this study explained the
importance of discussing decisions to withdraw/-hold treat-
ment with the patient. The majority of physicians (8/14)
considered that these discussions should take place ‘‘when
things get worse’’ and ‘‘before [bad situations] actually
occur’’ [E7/f/ger]. Nine doctors evoked their particular con-
cern about ‘‘making a decision on behalf of somebody else’’
[E1/m/onc] who is unable to communicate their will and to
consent to the decision. Such situations present dilemmas for
physicians according a strong value to patient preferences and
discussion.
When reflecting on reasons why patient wishes are not
always known, most English physicians (8/14) referred to
problems regarding the ‘‘right’’ timing to have discussion
about future treatments. They explained that often they get
to know their patients when they are already ‘‘quite a long
way down the road’’ and can ‘‘have no meaningful con-
versation anymore’’ [E4/m/ger]. This problem was repor-
ted particularly by five doctors working in geriatrics or
with chronic neurodegenerative diseases. These physicians
considered having only limited experience in discussing
future treatment preferences with the patient.
Other physicians (3/14) acknowledged that even if their
patients are competent they might delay discussion on
future treatment because it means ‘‘acknowledging that life
is now limited’’ [E1/m/onc]. In his work on prognosis,
Christakis (1997) has shown that this problem is inherent in
medical profession. Since medical science has improved
and doctors are progressively supposed to ‘‘eradicate dis-
ease’’, deterioration of the patient’s health condition and
death are seen as a failure ‘‘not just of the therapeutic
armamentarium to achieve its objective, but also of the
physician to fulfil his or her social role’’ (Christakis 1997,
p. 314).
One doctor in this study added weight to Christakis’
view when she explained how she avoids confronting the
patient and herself with a poor prognosis:
In using the lack of information [about possible
outcomes] as excuse, we still collude with ourselves
to not say how bad it is. Partly because it’s not always
bad, and partly because we’ve not found the words;
and partly because it’s pushing stones uphill. I think
quite a lot of this is just an excuse for not facing our
own mortality, rather than a really good reason for
not raising the subject. [E3/f/pall]
This physician and her colleagues use the uncertainty about
the course of a disease to avoid facing deeper concerns,
such as the patient’s and their own mortality.
The interviews suggest that English physicians seem to
be torn between their wish to respect patient preferences,
which is emphasised in law and professional guidelines
(Mental Capacity Act 2005; General Medical Council
2008, 2010; Liverpool Care Pathway 2012) and their
unease about communicating a bad prognosis. Hence,
deciding to discontinue life-sustaining treatment where the
patient’s wish is not clearly known is a dilemma for Eng-
lish physicians.
French physicians’ difficulties in withdrawing
or withholding treatment
The situation is different in France. Following the devel-
opments in other European countries, the law of 2005 has
been presented by its authors as an important step to
introduce greater focus on patient autonomy at the end of
life (Sicard 2012). Yet, as Thouvenin points out, the actual
goal of the law which was drafted by a commission pre-
sided by a physician, Jean Leonetti, was not only to
strengthen patient rights at the end of life (Assemble´e
Nationale 2008b, p. 404–405). By clarifying the conditions
under which a physician can withdraw/-hold life-sustaining
treatment in accordance with their professional opinion, the
law principally focuses on reassuring physicians of the
legitimacy of their acts.
Though the law emphasises that medical decisions
should be informed by patient preferences it also makes
clear that the judgment about the usefulness of a treatment
belongs to the physician alone (see article L. 1111-4 Public
Health Code; Thouvenin 2011).
Echoing this situation, one of the French doctors inter-
viewed explained:
I don’t need my patients’ opinion to withdraw treat-
ment […] If I think that the patient shouldn’t be
resuscitated, that she has no chance, I don’t need her
opinion for this. [F11/m/onc]
This physician refers to the law of 2005 allowing the
physician to withdraw or withhold treatment according to
their judgment and without being obliged to respect the
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patient’s wish. Whereas some French physicians start
discussing the importance of critically evaluating the
benefit of treatment at an advanced stage of illness, this
has not always been so.
French doctors favoured for many years active treatment
even at the end of life and the law of 2005 did not
immediately change this well-entrenched attitude. Still
today, active interventions continue being of particular
value for physicians. (Assemble´e Nationale 2008a; Horn
2011)
One French doctor explained that she ‘‘never’’ stops
treatment,
…because I’m the one who starts it and many
patients actually prefer to die from a chemotherapy,
rather than from cancer. […] I don’t want to disap-
point my patients. I think by withdrawing treatments
we make a moral judgment of the value of the
patient’s life, which I don’t want to do at all. […]
Recently, I felt like a traitor when the palliative care
team persuaded me to stop a treatment although the
patient wanted to continue. I was glad when the
patient came back to me after a few days in the
palliative care service […] I think that patients ask for
treatment because this is how our relationship works.
[F7/f/onc]
This doctor did not adopt a critical view on medical
interventions and gives a strong account of her under-
standing of the doctor-patient relationship based on active
treatment. Treating a patient has moral significance for this
physician who compares withdrawing treatment with
judging the value of life. Therefore she feels like she is
betraying her patients when she stops providing treatment.
Later, this doctor explained that while she respects a
patient’s wish to continue treatment even when this
becomes harmful, it is very difficult for her to respect a
treatment refusal.
Although these two doctors express different viewpoints
about futile treatment they both share a similar view on
patient wishes. Where the doctors have a strong opinion
about the medical decision they do not consider the
patient’s will. The latter is evoked only in cases where it
supports the physician’s decision. The second doctor quo-
ted refers to the patient will in order to justify her decision
to continue futile treatment; a decision that is now ques-
tionable under the law of 2005 (article L. 1110-5 Civil
Code).
Several French doctors (5/14) confirmed that although
the law states that physicians must not insist on ‘‘unrea-
sonable’’ treatment, the persisting problem in France is that
‘‘most physicians still maintain a curative perspective and
always want to go further in order to avoid death’’ [F3/f/
neph]. One doctor even called this attitude the ‘‘barbarism
of French doctors’’ [F11/m/onc].
Nevertheless, the law of 2005 seems to have some
impact on French physicians, at least on their discourses.
The majority of the doctors that have been interviewed (10/
14) thought that although it is indeed difficult for them to
do so, it would be important to limit interventions at the
end-of-life. One of the doctors explained here that:
there are social rules […] and we have to avoid that
after three months people end up in a vegetative state.
[…] That poses the question of how much will this
cost the society. And, then we also have to ask what
the emotional and social burden is for the family?
[F1/m/intens]
The consequences of unreasonable medical interventions
are considered from a social perspective, rather than from
an individual perspective. Other physicians interviewed
also focused on a range of aspects that did not take into
account the individual wish. For example, half of the
physicians (7/14) listed criteria, such as ‘‘professional
consensus’’ or ‘‘medical criteria’’ (such as increasing
somnolence and respiratory insufficiency) or ‘‘families’
preferences’’, according to which they decide to stop or to
continue treatment for incompetent patients. Other than
their English colleagues, none of the doctors evoked
previous patient preferences as a decision criterion.
These interviews revealed, despite changing attitudes, a
strong commitment among French physicians to intervene
therapeutically to maintain life, and some doctors attribute
a moral value to medical interventions. Yet, there is also a
growing awareness of the problems entailed by this atti-
tude. The French doctors interviewed perceived these
problems from a collective, social perspective, rather than
from that of the individual patient.
Decision-making procedures and the participation
of third parties
English physicians and the duty to empower patients
The English doctors’ focus on patient wishes was also
apparent in the way that all 14 English doctors discussed
the importance of giving information and helping the
patient to make decisions. In this they apparently agreed
with the Mental Capacity Act and professional guidelines.
They valued absolute respect for patients’ decisions if they
‘‘can be sure that the patient understands the situation’’
[E13/m/onc]. One English physician explained that if he
has given accurate information and the patient refuses the
treatment as a result, he feels
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very comfortable with that [because] it’s a sign of a
strong, as well as empowered patient, if they feel they
can turn around and say, ‘That’s not for me’. I just
want to find out whether there is something I could
change. [E1/m/onc]
This comment and the following quote show how the
certainty about a deliberate patient decision allows these
doctors to weigh respect for the patient wish against their
duty to safeguard patient welfare:
There is a conflict [of duties] but I’m absolutely sure
that a ‘bad decision’—as I would see it—from the
patient does not mean that they should be overridden
or that they don’t have capacity. […] The issue
is…does the patient really understand and was the
decision made at a time when they had capacity? [E4/
m/ger]
The reflected decision of an informed patient is decisive for
these physicians even where a patient decides against their
opinion. One doctor explained how she integrates such a
decision in her relationship with the patient:
At the end of the day my duty is to care, [that is] to
help the patient, even if it doesn’t feel like it’s the
right decision that I would make, but that’s their
choice. And then my focus will change onto ‘how can
we make life better for this person and ensure they
are as safe as they can be within what they want to
do?’ So, I think I have to accept it. [E7/f/ger]
For this doctor, professional duties are not limited to
clinical criteria. She perceives her duty as one of serving
the patient according to their individual needs and
preferences.
Even in the case where a patient is incompetent, and has
no valid AD, most English doctors (10/14) reported that
they try to take into account all opinions, such as those
expressed in previous statements or by the family, friends,
carers, the general practitioner, etc. This attitude echoes the
recommendations regarding the best interests assessment as
defined in the Mental Capacity Act, stating that physical
well-being should be balanced with emotional/psycholog-
ical well-being by taking into account the incapacitated
person’s values, past preferences or present feelings.
Most physicians (8/14) explained that it is important to
get the family ‘‘on board’’, to discuss with them and know
their view. Yet, all of these physicians explained that they
would never entirely rely on the family’s opinion because
they do ‘‘not always act in a patient’s best interests’’ [E8/f/
neph] and according to their wishes. They explained that
most families do not really reflect on previous values of the
patient but insist on treatment ‘‘partly out of fear that
they’ll be seen as the agent of the death of somebody they
love’’ [E2/m/nep]. Therefore, a physician [E5/f/rheum] told
that although she discusses decisions with the family, she
makes clear that she alone bears the responsibility for it
(see also Kitzinger and Kitzinger 2012).
The priority English physicians set on individual patient
wishes points to a libertarian tradition which goes back to
authors such as Locke (1993) or Mill (2005), as well as to
the Protestant influence backing the right to make one’s
own decisions (Dickenson 1999). Yet, physicians are also
concerned to balance the right to free choice with their
professional duty to ensure welfare interests of a vulnerable
patient. It is against this background that the physicians
want to rely on an autonomous wish that is on a reflected
decision made when the patient was competent and has
understood the consequences of the decision. English law
also focuses on autonomous decision-making. Yet, in
medical practice as well as in jurisprudence (Coggon and
Miola 2011), the implementation of autonomy is not
always a matter of course. It often seems to remain a
theoretical ideal.
French physicians’ responsibility to protect the patient
Most French doctors (10/14) also emphasised the importance
of informing the patient before asking their opinion. Yet, half
of these physicians (5/10) believe that they should present
their clinical opinion to the patient because ‘‘the final deci-
sion remains medical’’ [F2/m/ger]. One physician explained
that regardless of what the patient wishes ‘‘in the end, we win,
the patient loses’’ [F1/m/intens]. Another physician,
although recognising the importance of respecting the
patient’s wish, thought that it is often more important to
reassure the patient, to explain that the staff is
responsible for them, that it’s our business to preserve
their humanity, protect their dignity and to explain
that we are the guarantors of their dignity. […] What
is important for us is the social guarantee we can give
the patient because we are a country with social
values. [F8/m/onc]
The values at stake are humanity, dignity and solidarity.
This doctor wants his patients to feel that the medical body
acts according to social values and takes responsibility for
patients in need.
A similar understanding of the patient as being part of
and protected by the society is presented by another French
physician who thought that
patients have not only rights, but also duties; the duty
to consider the other. I think that our society is pro-
gressively a ‘right-to’ society and thus it’s up to the
patient to decide. It’s pseudo-individualism and I
think that the perversion of this is that the patient
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should be alone responsible for everything. But the
decision is a collective one and is more global. [F14/
m/neur]
This doctor refuses the primacy of decisional autonomy
and justifies his opinion by a particular view of the
individual tied into the society through her duties towards
others. The individual is not alone responsible for her
decisions because these are ‘‘collective’’ in a broader social
sense. For this physician, ‘‘collective’’ decisions do not
seem to mean shared decision-making. Rather, he appears
to be in line with the French National Ethics Committee
(CCNE) which stated in 2000 that medical decisions
should be in accordance with the society’s values. More
precisely, the Committee considered that the physician is a
‘‘representative of the community’’ who ‘‘defends and
promotes the values of the society’’ (CCNE 2000, p. 11).
This perspective alludes to Rousseau’s (1954) understand-
ing of the relationship between the individual and society.
According to Rousseau’s idea of the social contract, every
individual’s opinions and preferences are subject to the
general will which represents the interests of the society as
a whole. The general will need to be guided by individuals
which are concerned with the public interests and which
want to promote social harmony and cooperation. The
CCNE attributes this role to physicians. Such an under-
standing endorses the subordination of individual patient
preferences to socially sanctioned medical opinions (see
also Horn 2012, 2013; De Vries et al. 2009)
When French doctors reflected on the participation of
third parties in the decision-making process, they
explained, similarly to the English physicians, that they do
not want to rely too heavily on the family. One French
physician explained that ‘‘it will be too difficult and violent
for [the family], and they might break down’’ [F13/m/neur]
if they are expected to make decisions about treatment
limitations. Like the English doctors, the French physicians
want to ease the family’s feelings of guilt. Yet, unlike the
English doctors interviewed, none of the French physicians
expressed concerns that the family might not be best able to
communicate the patient’s values and preferences. On the
contrary, two doctors working with amyotrophic lateral
sclerosis patients explained that if the family takes a stand
(whether positive or negative) on a heavily invasive treat-
ment such as a tracheotomy, they would tend to follow the
family’s request, regardless of what a patient may have
expressed at an earlier point. In the end, these doctors
explained that it is the family who has to care for the
patient at their home, and following their wish ‘‘prevents
also maltreatment of the patient’’ [F13/m/neur].
In the interviews, French doctors expressed their view
about the patient as being a part of society. Individual
patient preferences are subordinated to collective values
aiming to protect the vulnerable person and to guarantee
their social integration. These values are defended by the
medical body, who are thus allowed to make decisions on
behalf of the individual.
Meaning, sense and use of ADs
Doctors in both countries described having little experience
with written directives and that those they had encountered
tended to be written up by ‘‘educated middle class people
who are neither sick nor old, thus who do not really need
an AD’’ [E2/m/neph] (see also Cicirelli 1998). English
physicians considered however that often patients make
verbal advance statements.
English physicians’ doubts regarding the genuineness
of ADs
Consistent with the importance English physicians accord to
patient preferences, all doctors appreciated the idea of ADs and
considered them to be completely binding ‘‘if’’ they are valid.
‘‘Knowing what [patients] expect from their medical care’’
[E14/f/pall], having ‘‘patients’ feelings written down’’ [E10/m/
neph] was much appreciated by the doctors. Yet, these state-
ments were often followed by ‘‘buts…’’ or ‘‘ifs…’’ and the
majority of doctors (8/14) explained that the main problem
actually concerns the validity of these documents because:
[…] they have to be very specific which is actually
quite difficult to predict, because you can never cover
every eventuality. [E4/m/ger]
So, ‘‘how do you know that’s genuine?’’ wondered one
physician [E5/f/rheum] and another stated that ‘‘the problem
is, it’s sort of time-bound, you know, it’s only a snapshot of
how someone is feeling at one point in their life […] so, how
sure can we be that this is the patient’s wish?’’ [E6/m/onc]As
already stated earlier, most physicians (10/14) considered
that in-depth discussion would enable them to better
understand the patient’s wishes. One of them thought that
discussions and conversations, particularly if wit-
nessed and shared by relatives, are far more important
than a piece of paper. [E2/m/neph]
Yet, four out of fourteen physicians pointed out that it is in
fact very difficult to introduce ADs in the discussion with
the patient because they could ‘‘imagine that’s quite scary
for them’’ [E3/f/pall]. One physician specified:
You don’t really want to be discussing death with
them when in fact you’re trying to say to them [that
the disease will develop slowly]. […] My head tells
me yes, yes we should always ask. And the
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practicalities of it say well, actually…but you
don’t…because it’s uncomfortable. [E4/m/ger]
This English physician faces a conflict between the ideal of
knowing patient preferences and his reluctance to tackle
difficult discussions about end of life.
The concern about the authenticity of wishes expressed in
advance echoes the ethical debate about ADs in the English
speaking world. Whereas some authors defend the role of ADs
in extending patient autonomy (Buchanan and Brock 1990;
Dworkin 1993), other authors question the moral authority of
previously expressed wishes and whether our (psychological)
personal identity remains the same throughout life or develops
continually, depending on various external and psychological
factors (Parfit 1984; Dresser 1994). Both arguments share the
concern for true patient autonomy. Yet, this seems to be a
theoretical ideal. In practice the wish to respect patient pref-
erences is met with an obstacle: the difficulty physicians
encounter in discussing prognoses and future treatment
options.
French physicians’ scepticism regarding ‘‘Anglo-
Saxon’’ principlism
Whereas English physicians evoked problems regarding
ADs as means to express a genuine will, French doctors
questioned the idea of an AD itself. Half of the physicians
(7/14) interviewed believed that ADs do not have a place in
French practice. One doctor pointed out that:
ADs are Anglo-Saxon inventions; it’s typical for
them [the ‘‘Anglo-Saxons’’] to determine and respect
all these principles. […] I draw a line between
something that is Anglo-Saxon and something that is
Latin because I want to give sense to a relationship
[…] and do not want to resolve problems by signing a
paper. [F3/f/neph]
Another French physician explained that ‘‘Anglo-Saxon
principlism’’ leads to the use of all kinds of ‘‘protocols,
ADs, do-not-resuscitate-orders, end-of-life protocols, etc.’’
without however helping doctors to make decisions. [FP1]
The arguments of these two doctors refer to the principlist
approach in bioethics (Beauchamp and Childress 2008)
which, as Callahan points out, ‘‘reflects the liberal, individ-
ualist culture from which it emerged’’ (Callahan 2003,
p. 288); this, as several doctors noticed, does not fit with the
idea that the physician makes socially sanctioned decisions in
caring for her patient.
When explaining that it is important to ‘‘remain com-
munity-minded and make collective, rather than individual
decisions’’, one French doctor even considered that ‘‘it’s
not ethical to rely only on the patient […]; it’s ridiculous!’’
[F1/m/intens]
A minority of physicians (5/14) recognised, however,
that although ‘‘the idea [of ADs] comes from the Anglo-
Saxon countries’’, such directives should be accepted also
in France. Yet, they considered that ‘‘on a cultural level
French people aren’t there yet’’ [F5/f/pall].
And indeed another physician explained that although
the law of 2005 is a real reform and reorientation of
medical practices these changes are new and […] the
French National Medical Council only recently
revised its paternalistic tradition. Prior to this, we
learned not to embarrass patients with their illness but
treated them in a way that we thought would be good
for them. [F6/f/pall]
Thus, before implementing ADs in France,
it would be more important to accept the idea of
palliative care, that is, of stopping treatment that has
no benefit and to accept that this is not the end [of
what physicians can do for a patient]—we have to
change our technical, body centred thinking and learn
to take into account the benefit, the comfort and the
patient’s wish. [F2/m/ger]
It appears that French doctors, who agreed that ADs could
be beneficial, referred to a particular meaning ADs have in
France. This was pointed out by the author of the law of
2005, Jean Leonetti. He explained that the principal reason
for introducing ADs was to ‘‘ease doctors’ feelings of
guilt’’ when withdrawing life-sustaining treatment (As-
semble´e Nationale 2008b, p. 237). Patient preferences
appear to be secondary. The need to ease feelings of guilt
shows how difficult it is for French doctors not to employ
all means to cure a patient.
The interviews revealed a long tradition of what is called
‘‘acharnement the´rapeutique’’ or ‘‘obstination the´rapeutique
de´raisonnable’’ in the French debate and which could best be
translated by ‘‘therapeutic determination or relentlessness’’
and ‘‘unreasonable therapeutic stubbornness’’ (Horn 2011).
These terms go beyond what is called in the English-speaking
literature ‘‘futile treatment’’ and reveal the strong attachment
of French physicians to the value of saving lives at any price.
This value is also emphasised by the Catholic tradition whose
impact on modern France cannot be denied (Willaime 1996).
Perspectives on improving the practicability of ADs
English physicians and practical solutions to improve
the use of ADs
Although English doctors questioned whether ADs always
express the genuine will of a person, they did nevertheless
propose practical solutions for promoting and improving
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the use of ADs. One doctor suggested that ‘‘proper docu-
mentation would probably be useful’’ [E4/m/ger]. Others
thought that ‘‘everyone [should] carry these smart cards or
microchips’’ [E5/f/rheum] so that ADs would be available
‘‘in an electronic patient record system’’ [E12/f/pall].3
Another solution two English physicians [E7/f/ger; E9/m/
onc] proposed was to include the general practitioner
because they follow the patient from the diagnosis until her
hospitalisation.
Doctors supported also the idea of introducing standard
forms of ADs in the patient’s medical file:
One thing that would be really, really helpful is if we
would have a page on treatment aims in our clerking
booklet that we go through, and you have to write the
patient’s history and their medication…I think that
just advanced thinking about what their ceiling of
care is going to be, would actually be really helpful.
Just to have that more in the culture of thinking right
at the start of coming in. [E5/f/rheum]
Another doctor objected that ‘‘making it bureaucratic,
distancing it from the personal [aspects] makes it easier
for the professional really, but it doesn’t make it that much
easier for the patient’’. Therefore, he suggested that form-
alising ADs has to go hand in hand with more discussion and
‘‘a greater acceptance that [advance-care-planning] is a
normal part of what [doctors] do.’’ [E4/m/ger]
The English physicians interviewed allude to the Liv-
erpool Care Pathway, emphasising besides ADs, broader
advance-care-planning and doctor-patient communication
on end-of-life care. Advance-care-planning can help iden-
tifying patients’ general and specific preferences. It thus
helps assessing the authenticity of a wish (Horn and ter
Meulen 2014) which is important for English doctors when
facing the conflict between respect for patient preferences
and their concern for patient welfare. Yet, like ADs,
advance-care-planning requires facing and communicating
bad prognosis which, in practice, makes physicians reluc-
tant to implement either of these possibilities.
French physicians and their perspectives on improving
end-of-life care in general
The majority of French doctors (8/14) also thought that the
use of ADs should be improved, but none of them dis-
cussed concrete solutions. Instead, their suggestions con-
cerned physicians’ attitudes in general. According to one of
them, physicians in France should ‘‘first learn to accept
that medicine is not almighty and cannot improve every
condition’’. [F11/m/onc]
In order to do so, one doctor would wish to
integrate more of what you call ‘soft sciences’ in
France; I mean a bit more of social and human sci-
ences and less science-sciences in our studies as well
as amongst our staff members. [F3/f/neph]
This doctor explained further that physicians should not
only focus on physiology but should ‘‘know what it means
to be empathetic, what emotions are, and which values are
important’’. She did not specify which values are important
to her. She explained that being a nephrologist she ‘‘has no
culture to refuse [treatment]’’ because ‘‘discontinuing
[treatment] in nephrology is discontinuing a personal
relationship [she has] created over many years’’. This
physician expresses a strong emotional attachment to her
patients. There may be difficulty in withdrawing treatment
if doctors cannot adopt the ‘‘detached concern’’ that Fox
and Lief (1963) observed amongst physicians who learn to
be empathetic at the same time as keeping an emotional
distance from the patient.
Most French physicians (10/14) believed that they had
to learn to question the benefit and aims of treatments
before the ‘‘Anglo-Saxon’’ idea of ADs could be realised
[F13/m/neur]. Because their arguments focused on
improving their evaluation of what treatment is beneficial
in a singular case, the doctors did not mention patient
preferences as a criterion to determine the benefit. Even
where French physicians adopt a critical view of their
practices, patient wishes are not decisive in end-of-life
decision-making. In such an environment, ADs are not
needed in order to enhance patient autonomy, but remain
an exotic idea, difficult to integrate in medical practice.
Conclusion
Drawing upon an analysis of interviews with French and
English doctors, this study shows how patient preferences
are taken into consideration in different social and cultural
contexts and how these differences influence physicians’
perspectives and attitudes towards ADs. Such an investi-
gation demonstrates context specific reasons for the resis-
tance towards the implementation of ADs, irrespective of
whether the cultural and legal context favours respect for
patient autonomy—and therefore ADs—or not.
In England, a country with a strong libertarian tradition
that values respect for individual wishes and beliefs, phy-
sicians consider ADs as important means to enhance
patient autonomy. Yet at the same time, the understanding
of autonomy as an ideal according to which a person’s wish
is authentic and free of influences explains English physi-
cians’ reluctance to the implementation of ADs. Although
they believe that assurance about the authenticity of
3 To date neither England nor France supports a system that would
formalise the use of ADs in daily practice.
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autonomous decisions can be established through doctor-
patient discussion, they describe their reluctance to have
such communication in the light of bad prognosis and
death. In order to better understand the physicians’ diffi-
culties in implementing values that are imbedded in their
culture and law, it will be important to further investigate
their practices. Such investigation will help to address
problems related to the implementation of ADs within a
context where patient preferences are valued.
By contrast, countries, such as France, with a rather
holistic approach focus on collective, social aspects rather
than individual preferences. From such a perspective, the
vulnerable person must be protected by the medical body
representing and defending universal social values. There-
fore decisions can be made on behalf of the patient and
according to the professional opinion relaying social values.
In such a context, ADs, which imply disclosure, communi-
cation, and respect for individual wishes, are perceived as a
foreign concept that does not match with the respective
medical attitudes (see also Menaca et al. 2012; Evans et al.
2013). Yet, as the example of France shows, things begin to
change and it will be interesting to further observe if, and if
so, how physicians integrate gradually the new emphasis on
patient autonomy in their practice. Further research should
also explore whether ADs can be useful in the French context
or whether other forms of advance care planning focusing not
only on patient wishes but also on physicians’ responsibili-
ties to advise vulnerable patients, could be more effective.
Physicians’ reservations about the practical implementa-
tion of ADs vary depending of the role patient preferences
play in a certain country. Surprisingly, problems associated
with the use of ADs are not lesser in a context that emphasises
respect for patient autonomy than in a context that does not
see/perceive patient autonomy as the overriding principle.
The problems perceived in each context are different and
need to be addressed in a specific way. If policy-makers want
to improve the implementation of ADs, measures should be
taken to reassure English physicians about the authenticity of
the patient will. In France, doctors should be reassured that
taking into account patients’ wishes does not put in question
their professional competency. In both countries, such
measures could aim to enhance the recognition of ‘‘the
relational aspects of autonomy and central human needs for
support and communication’’ (Krones and Bastami 2014,
p. 195). Understanding ADs as means to open a dynamic
dialogue between physicians and patients could ease ten-
sions that emerged in each country: tensions between phy-
sicians’ wishes to respect patient preferences and the
difficulty to initiate discussions about such preferences, and
tensions between the value of therapeutic interventions and
the emerging focus on patient participation.
The study suggests the importance of taking into
account different cultural and social contexts in the ethical
analysis of ADs as well as in policy-making. Understand-
ing the differences between the physician-patient rela-
tionship and the role of patient preferences in England and
France helps to inform the kind of policy and ethical
guidance that should be developed. It follows that a com-
parative approach of these countries is an important first
step in developing comprehensive recommendations for
the use and implementation of ADs.
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